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I. INTRODUCTION
IN GREGG V. GEORGIA,' PROFFIT V. FLORIDA' AND JUREK V. TEXAS,, the
United States Supreme Court decided that the punishment of death
in and of itself is not inherently cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution.' However, the Court has
provided that the procedure for determining whether to impose the death
penalty must conform to certain minimum constitutional standards.' In
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
4 The eighth amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment is applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
' See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (family history and emotional
disturbance, as relevant mitigating factors, may not be precluded from the
sentencer's consideration as a matter of law); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)
(information obtained by court-appointed psychiatrist who did not advise defen-
dant of his fifth and sixth amendment rights cannot be used at the sentencing
hearing); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (precluding instruction to capital
jury on lesser-included offense violates due process); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420 (1980) (a broad and vague construction of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (limiting range of mitigating factors to be considered violates the
eighth and fourteenth amendments); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (un-
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Gregg and Proffitt, the Court approved the listing and utilization of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances! The aggravating specifications
permit the trier of fact to consider the circumstances of the crime, and
the mitigating factors allow consideration of the defendant's character.
Both circumstances and character must be considered and weighed against
each other before imposing the death sentence.
Two years after Gregg, in Lockett v. Ohio7 and Bell v. Ohio,8 the Supreme
Court held that Ohio's death penalty statute was unconstitutional. At that
time, the statute permitted consideration of only a limited range of
mitigating circumstances at the sentencing phase of a capital case.' The
disclosed portion of presentence investigation report cannot be relied upon in
deciding to impose the death penalty); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(mandatory death penalty statute is unconstitutional); and Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death penalty statute is unconstitutional).
6 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-98 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 248-51 (1976).
7 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Sandra Lockett, the driver of the getaway car in a planned
robbery of a pawn shop, was convicted of aggravated murder with the aggravating
circumstances (1) that the murder was committed for the purpose of escaping
detection, apprehension, trial or punishment for aggravated robbery, and (2) that
the murder was committed while committing, attempting to commit or fleeing
immediately after committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery pur-
suant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03-.04 (Page 1975) (repealed 1978). Id. at
589. The sentence of death was upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio. State v.
Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976).
1 438 U.S. 637 (1978). Willie Lee Bell was convicted of aggravated murder
with the aggravating circumstance that it occurred during a kidnapping, and he
was sentenced to death. His death sentence was upheld by the Ohio Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio. Bell v. Ohio, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358
N.E.2d 556 (1978).
' The 1974 Ohio death penalty statute required that once a defendant was
found guilty of aggravated murder with at least one aggravating circumstance
contained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Page 1975) (repealed 1978), the
death penalty would be imposed unless:
considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history,
character, and condition of the offender, one or more of the following
is established by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) The victim of the
offense induced or facilitated it. (2) It is unlikely that the offense would
have been committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress,
coercion, or strong provocation. (3) The offense was primarily the pro-
duct of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condi-
tion is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. § 2929.04(B).
The aggravating circumstances in the 1974 death penalty statute were:
(1) The offense was the assassination of the president of the United
States or person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the gover-
nor or lieutenant governor of this state, or of the president-elect or vice
president-elect of the United States, or of the governor-elect or lieuten-
ant governor-elect, or of a candidate for any of the foregoing offices. For
purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if he has been nominated
for election according to law, or if he has filed a petition or petitions
according to law to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary or
[Vol. 31:495
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Court concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death."'" As a result, Ohio's amended statute requires
consideration of several specific mitigating factors and "[a]ny other
[mitigating] factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender
should be sentenced to death.""
Perhaps because of Lockett and the concerns involving the mitigating
factors as a component of individualized sentencing, little attention has
been given to analyzing the aggravating circumstances of death penalty
statutes. The aggravating circumstances, however, are very important
because the death penalty may not be imposed unless the indictment con-
tains one or more of the enumerated aggravating circumstances. 2 Thus,
general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary
or general election.
(2) The offense was committed for hire.
(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection,
apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the
offender.
(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in
a detention facility as defined in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
(5) The offender has previously been convicted of an offense of which
the gist was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, commit-
ted prior to the offense at bar, or the offense at bar was part of a course
of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or
more persons by the offender.
(6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer whom the
offender knew to be such, and either the victim was engaged in his duties
at the time of the offense, or it was the offender's specific purpose to
kill a law enforcement officer.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, at-
tempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempt-
ing to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery,
or aggravated burglary.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(1)-(7) (Page 1975) (repealed 1978). For a discus-
sion of prior revisions to the aggravating circumstances provision of the statute
by the Senate Judiciary Committee and, subsequently, by the Committee on Con-
ference, see Lehman & Norris, Some Legislative History and Comments on Ohio's
New Criminal Code, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 8, 18-23 (1974).
10 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original). For a more
comprehensive analysis of Lockett and Bell, see Note, Constitutional Criminal
Law-The Role of Mitigating Circumstances in Considering the Death Penalty, 53
TUL. L. REV. 608 (1979); Comment, 12 AKRON U.L. REV. 360 (1978).
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(B)(7) (Page 1982). For an excellent analysis
of how the mitigating factors of Ohio's new statute affect its constitutionality,
see Note, Fact or Fiction: Mitigating the Death Penalty in Ohio (Mar. 28, 1983)
(unpublished manuscript on file at the CLEV. ST. L. REV.).
12 Id. S 2929.04(A).
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indicted individuals are subject to capital punishment only if the indict-
ment meets the criteria established by the legislature. 3
The state of Ohio enacted a new death penalty statute which became
effective October 19, 1981." As of January 18, 1983, eighty-three defen-
dants had been indicted under the new statute." It is, therefore, both
" Id. S 2929.03(C)(2). One commentator has categorized capital sentencing pro-
cedures into two stages: (1) the definition stage, where the legislature identifies
the class of those who may die, for example, by enumerating aggravating cir-
cumstances; and (2) the selection stage, where the legislature through the specific
arrangement of its sentencing process can affect the risk of execution. Gillers,
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1980).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. SS 2313.37, 2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.02.1, 2929.02.2,
2929.02.3, 2929.02.4, 2929.03, 2929.04, 2929.05, 2929.06, 2929.41, 2941.14, 2945.06,
2945.18, 2945.19, 2945.21, 2945.24, 2945.25, 2953.02, 2967.13, 2967.19, 2967.26, 2967.27
(Page 1982). For an examination of the new statutes see THE OHIO DEATH PENAL-
TY TASK FORCE, OHIO DEATH PENALTY MANUAL 11 (1981); Benson, Constitutional-
ity of Ohio's New Death Penalty Statute, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 77 (1982); Note, S.B.
1 Ohio Enacts Death Penalty Statute, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 531 (1982).
The majority of the states have enacted death penalty statutes containing
enumerated aggravating circumstances. ALA. CODE 5 13A-5-49 (1982); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 13-703(F) (Supp. 1982-83); ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 41-1303 (1977); CAL.
PENAL CODE S 190.2 (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 16-11-103(6) (1978 &
Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 53a-46a (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, S 4209(e) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE
ANN. S 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE S 19-2515(f) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, S 9-1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-2-9(b) (Burns
1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 532.025(2)(a) (Baldwin 1981); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.4 (West 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1982); MISS. CODE
ANN. S 99-19-101(5) (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 565.012(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT.
CODE ANN. S 46-18-303 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. S 29-2523(1) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
S 200.033 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 630:5-11(a) (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.
5 31-20A-5 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(e) (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S 701.12 (West Supp.
1981-1982); S.C. CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(C)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. S 23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. S 39-2404(i) (Supp. 1981); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. S 9A.32.045 (1977); WYO. STAT. S 6-4-102(h) (1977 & Supp. 1982).
Utah has criminalized its eight aggravating circumstances into the substan-
tive offense of murder in the first degree. UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-202 (1978).
Virginia will not impose a sentence of death unless the court or jury finds
"a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct ...
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved tor-
ture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." VA. CODE 5
19.2-264.2 (Supp. 1982). See Gillers, supra note 13, at 101 app. for a thorough analysis
of state capital punishment statutes.
11 According to information provided by the Ohio Public Defender Commis-
sion, the following capital indictments have been filed with the Ohio Supreme
Court as of Jan. 18, 1983: State v. Ageel, No. B823360 (C.P. Hamilton County);
State v. Balfour, No. 171152 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Bright, Nos. 175776,
175882 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Brooks, No. CR172340 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County); State v. Brown, No. CR178023B (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Camp-
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bell, No. CR172249 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Canadix, No. CR177792B
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Carver, No. 81-CR329 (C.P. Richland County);
State v. Cobble, No. CR170365 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Collins, No.
CR175633 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Corky, No. CR175147 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County); State v. Craig, No. 177-628 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Cross, No.
CR-179001 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Curtis, No. 82-CR-11-3886 (C.P.
Franklin County); State v. Daiden, No. 82-CR-347 (C.P. Allen County); State v.
Davidson, No. 177628 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Dillard, No. 176128 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County); State v. Dillon, No. 82-CR-19 (C.P. Lawrence County); State
v. Edwards, No. 174350 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. D. Evans, No. 170885D
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. T. Evans, No. CR175146 (C.P. Cuyahoga County);
State v. Fellows, No. 82-CR-470 (C.P. Trumbull County); State v. Fields, No.
CR176754 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Ford, No. CR178023 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County); State v. Forny, No. 82-443B (C.P. Summit County); State v. Freeman,
No. 170885A (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Garland, No. B825419 (C.P. Hamilton
County); State v. Glenn, No. 81CR933 (C.P. Mahoning County); State v. Grant,
No. 170885B (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Griffin, No. 174350 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County); State v. Grosjean, No. CR-82-6432 (C.P. Lucas County); State v. Harvey,
No. CR177792A (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Henderson, No. 82 CR 16 (C.P.
Adams County); State v. Holbrook, No. 82-CR-018 (C.P. Wayne County); State
v. Holland, No. 8920 (C.P. Fairfield County); State v. Hughes, No. 5891-CR-82-130
(C.P. Crawford County); State v. Hunrer, No. CR82-214 (C.P. Scioto County); State
v. Jenkins, No. CR168784 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Johnson, No. 176802
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Jones, No. CR81-89 (C.P. Lawrence County);
State v. Jordan, No. CR168784 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Kiser, No. 82CR69
(C.P. Ross County); State v. Limle, No. 82CR051834 (C.P. Franklin County); State
v. Lowery, No. CR173004-A (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Maurer, No. 822545
(C.P. Stark County); State v. Miller, No. 82-06-0762 (C.P. Summit County); State
v. Mitchell, No. 82-CR-229 (C.P. Richland County); State v. Moore, No. 82-3-339
(C.P. Summit County); State v. Mullins, No. 5941 (C.P. Ashland County); State
v. Nagy, No. CR169581 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Patterson, No. CR169381
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Penly, No. 82CR241 (C.P. Clark County); State
v. Penn, No. 5941 (C.P. Union County); State v. Riffe, No. CR82-67 (C.P. Lawrence
County); State v. A. Robinson, No. 82-443-C (C.P. Summit County); State v. J.
Robinson, No. 171267 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. B. Rogers, No. CR81-6906
(C.P. Lucas County); State v. D. Rogers, No. 82-443-A (C.P. Summit County); State
v. J. Rogers, No. 82-CR-86 (C.P. Hardin County); State v. S. Rogers, No. CR177376
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Rucker, No. 82-CR-017 (C.P. Wayne County);
State v. Russell, No. 82-CR-5246 (C.P. Clermont County); State v. Sarkis, No. 172742
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Seal, No. B825419 (C.P. Hamilton County); State
v. Shaeffer, No. 82-06-0787 (C.P. Summit County); State v. Shields, No. CR173004-B
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Shugar, No. CR169829 (C.P. Cuyahoga County);
State v. Slaughter, No. CR 174675 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Smith, No. 170365
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Spisak, Nos. 176517, 176716 (C.P. Cuyahoga Coun-
ty); State v. Staffen, No. B824004 (C.P. Hamilton County); State v. Steward, No.
170385-C (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Stuber, No. 82-8-1011 (C.P. Summit
County); State v. Sykes, No. 81-CR-951 (C.P. Mahoning County); State v. Thomp-
kins, Nos. CR173611, CR174799 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. D. Thompson,
Nos. 176813-C, CR178023-C (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. J. Thompson, No.
82A15216 (C.P. Licking County); State v. R. Thompson, No. CR172810 (C.P.
Cuyahoga County); State v. Tribble, No. 826519 (C.P. Lucas County); State v. Wat-
son, No. 169470 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Whitley, No. C81CR-12-4375
(C.P. Franklin County); State v. Willingham, No. 171420 (C.P. Cuyahoga County);
State v. Woods, No. CR177550 (C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Wright, No. 177628
1982]
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necessary and timely to evaluate Ohio's statutory delineation of who may
die and its effect for compliance with constitutional mandates. This Note
sets forth the hypotheses and supporting legal authority for analyzing
Ohio's statutory aggravating circumstances individually and in the ag-
gregate on equal protection and procedural due process grounds.
II. HISTORY OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The United States Supreme Court has not expressly made the inclu-
sion of aggravating circumstances or specifications a necessity or prere-
quisite to the constitutionality of any state's death penalty statute. Rather,
aggravating circumstances have become one of the legislative responses
to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia.6 The listing of
aggravating circumstances obviates arbitrary and capricious decisions to
inflict the death penalty by narrowing and guiding a jury's discretion. 7
The legislatures have thereby eliminated the first element of possible
arbitrariness by pre-selecting for the jury those criminal activities which
subject the offender to the death penalty. 8 In effect, legislative discre-
tion is substituted for jury discretion. Various forms of statutes developed
across the country in response to Furman. Some states adopted ag-
gravating circumstances as a narrowing device and other states adopted
mandatory death sentence statutes to bridle jury discretion in its entirety.
(C.P. Cuyahoga County); State v. Zak, No. 173910 (C.P. Cuyahoga County). Ohio
Public Defender Commission, Columbus, Ohio.
In the Jenkins case, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge David T. Matia
overruled a motion to declare Ohio's new death penalty statute unconstitutional.
No. CR168784A (C.P. Cuyahoga County, Feb. 19, 1982). Judge Matia said that
"Ohio's new death penalty law is even more protective of a defendant's rights
than the death penalty statutes of several other states that have been upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court." The Clev. Press, Feb. 20, 1982, at A18, col. 3.
Leonard Jenkins was accused of killing a Cleveland police officer in a gun
battle following a bank robbery on October 21, 1981. Jenkins, who is paralyzed
from a spinal injury suffered in the gun battle, was the first person to be tried
under Ohio's new death penalty statute. Id. The jury found him guilty and recom-
mended the sentence of death. The Plain Dealer, Apr. 8, 1982, at Al, col. 4. Judge
David T. Matia upheld the jury's verdict and sentence recommendation. The Clev.
Press, Apr. 16, 1982, at Al, col. 1. The case is currently on appeal. State v. Jenkins,
No. 45231 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App., filed Apr. 16, 1982) (Cuyahoga County).
Since Jenkins, four men have been sentenced to die in Ohio's electric chair.
State v. Maurer, No. 82-2545 (C.P. Stark County 1983); State v. Penix, No.
82-CR-241 (C.P. Clark County 1983); State v. Glenn, No. 81CR933 (C.P. Mahoning
County 1982); State v. Rogers, No. 81-6906 (C.P. Lucas County 1982). For an
analysis of the written opinions of the trial judges in these cases and in State
v. Kiser, No. 82-CR69 (C.P. Ross County 1982) and State v. Jenkins, No. CR168784A
(C.P. Cuyahoga County 1982), see Note, supra note 11.
'6 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192-95 (1976).
8 Id. at 195.
[Vol. 31:495
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The Supreme Court struck down mandatory death penalty statutes in
Woodson v. North Carolina9 and Roberts v. Louisiana,' but upheld statutes
limiting jury discretion through the use of aggravating circumstances in
Gregg v. Georgia2 ' and Proffitt v. Florida." While still not expressly re-
quired, it is reasonable to assume that aggravating circumstances have
been implied in the Court's decisions," and that their form has been ex-
pressly adopted as appropriate and constitutional in an effort to guide
jury discretion. 4
Narrowing discretion in the determination of a particular punishment
is not a novel proposition." "[J]ustice generally requires . . . that there
be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the
character and propensities of the offender."' What is unique about capital
punishment cases, however, is that the jury under most statutes is per-
mitted to recommend a particular sentence, namely, life or death.' Among
,9 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
20 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
21 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For excellent analyses of Supreme Court interpreta-
tions from Furman through Gregg, see England, Capital Punishment in the Light
of Constitutional Evolution: An Analysis of Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg,
52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 596 (1977); Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving
Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989
(1978); Tao, The Constitutional Status of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Gregg,
Jurek, Roberts, and Woodson, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 345 (1977); The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 63-76 (1976).
22 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
23 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Id.
at 313 (White, J., concurring).
24 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
25 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
2" Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937). See generally
Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considera-
tions, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 29 (1976) (viable challenge to criminal sentencing
disparities on equal protection grounds).
2' The following state statutes require the judge, in a case tried to a jury,
to impose the sentence recommended by the jury: ARK. STAT. ANN. S 41-1302
(1977); CAL. PENAL CODE S 190.3 (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. S
16-11-103(4) (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 53a-46a (West Supp. 1981); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, S 4209(d) (1979); GA. CODE ANN. S 27-2534.1(c) (Supp. 1982);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 9-1(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
S 532.025 (Baldwin Supp. 1981); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.8 (West Supp.
1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, S 413(k) (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. S 99-19-101 (1979);
Mo. ANN. STAT. S 565.008 (Vernon 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. S 175.554 (1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5-IV (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 31-20A-3 (Supp. 1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S 701.11 (West 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 23A-27A-4 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN.
S 3 9-2404(g) (Supp. 1981); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp.
1981); UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-207(2) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 9A.32.040(1)
(Supp. 1981); WYO. STAT. S 6-4-102(f) (1977).
If tried by a jury, Ohio permits the trial jury to recommend a sentence of
death. The court is then permitted to make an independent determination of
1982]
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the problems created by jury sentencing is that as a result of a particular
jury's obvious inexperience in sentencing, the jury may not use the infor-
mation properly. The jury's sentencing decision may then result in an
arbitrary or capricious decision to condemn a particular defendant to
death. If a jury is given guidance in its decision-making, the theory is
that the risk of wholly arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the
jury is minimized."
A specific area of concern immediately surfaces: What standards, if any,
can be developed to guide the jury's sentencing deliberations? In
McGautha v. California,' Justice Harlan opined that it would be impossi-
ble to formulate such standards. He stated that it was beyond present
human ability "[t]o identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal
homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and
to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood
and applied by the sentencing authority.""0
Contrary to Justice Harlan's contention in McGautha, the drafters of
the Model Penal Code had developed standards which included "cir-
cumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed and
weighed against each other ... .""3 The Court in Gregg thus concluded
that even though the listing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
was somewhat general, such a standard would provide guidance to the
jury, thereby reducing the likelihood that a jury would impose a capricious
or arbitrary sentence.3 ' The Court did not suggest that the listing of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances would inevitably satisfy the con-
cerns of Furman regarding arbitrary and capricious decision-making or
that such listing was the only acceptable way to provide standards for
the jury. What the Court ultimately decided was that it would not be
impossible to draft such standards.' Once drafted, the standards would
be subject to judicial examination.'
whether the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of commit-
ting outweigh the mitigating factors. If not, the court is permitted to vacate the
jury's recommended sentence of death. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.03(D)(2)-(3)
(Page 1982). For an indication and discussion of how the trial judges are weighing
the aggravating and mitigating factors against each other, see Note, supra note 11.
28 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated sub nom., Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
' 402 U.S. at 204. The failure of appellate review of death penalties may be due
to the fact that objective standards are impossible to achieve. Dix, Appellate Review
of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L.J. 97, 161 (1979). For a discussion of
jury sentencing standards, see RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 139-42 (1982).
31 MODEL PENAL CODE S 201.6, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (emphasis
in original), quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976). The standards
referred to may be found at MODEL PENAL CODE S 210.6 (Official Draft 1980).
32 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95.
Id. at 195.
3 Id.
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The type of standard approved in Gregg was the listing of aggravating
circumstances which narrowed the class of defendants subject to capital
punishment.3" In addition, the statute authorized the jury to consider
mitigating circumstances." In this way, the jury is required to consider
the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before recommending
a sentence, thereby having its discretion "controlled by clear and objec-
tive standards so as to produce non-discriminatory application."37 The im-
portance then of the "clear and objective standards" becomes manifest.
Equally important is the type of review, if any, to be accorded these
legislative standards imposed upon the jury.
III. SCRUTINY BY THE INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
The judicial review accorded death penalty statutes has been unclear
and inconsistent. Most of the Justices have vacillated in different cases
so that it is not surprising that death penalty statutes, and/or the death
penalty itself as a form of punishment, have been held to be both
constitutional3" and unconstitutional39 within a period of only five years.
Within the present Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall have remained
consistent in their approach to capital punishment cases. They find the
death penalty cruel and unusual punishment whether the attack on the
particular statute is substantive or procedural. In particular, Justice Bren-
nan advocates an activist role by claiming that the Supreme Court "in-
escapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our
Constitution, to say whether ... the punishment of death ... is no longer
morally tolerable in our civilized society."4 This duty of the Court is not
"only permitted but compelled by the [eighth amendment]."4
For purposes of eighth amendment analysis to ensure that its inter-
pretations reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society,"42 Justice Brennan adopted the following test:
A punishment will be unconstitutional if: (1) it does not comport with human
dignity;43 and (2) it is excessive." To meet part one of the test, the punish-
" Id. at 165 n.9.
36 Id. at 166-67, 211.
17 Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974).
38 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971),
vacated sub nom., Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
" Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 229. See Tao, Beyond Furman v. Georgia: The Need for
a Morally Based Decision on Capital Punishment, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 722, 736
(1976).
41 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 230.
4" Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion).
43 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 230.
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ment must not be so severe as to be degrading,45 the punishment must
not be inflicted arbitrarily, 6 and the punishment must be acceptable to
contemporary society. ' To comply with part two, the punishment must
serve a penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment."
Justice Brennan, in effect, has adopted a state compelling interest/least
restrictive means analysis.49
Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment because: (1) it is excessive; and (2) it is morally unacceptable.'
In determining excessiveness, Justice Marshall questions whether the
death penalty is necessary to accomplish the legitimate legislative pur-
poses of punishment or whether a less severe penalty would suffice.51 He
measures moral acceptability by whether an informed citizenry would con-
sider the death penalty shocking and unjust. 2 As to the role of the
judiciary with regard to legislative enactments, Justice Marshall has stated
that:
The point has now been reached at which deference to the
legislatures is tantamount to abdication of our judicial roles as
factfinders, judges, and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution. We
know that at some point the presumption of constitutionality ac-
corded legislative acts gives way to a realistic assessment of those
acts. This point comes when there is sufficient evidence available
so that judges can determine, not whether the legislature acted
wisely, but whether it had any rational basis whatsoever for
acting.'
While Justice Marshall has couched his evaluation in terms of a rational
basis test, it is apparent that he will require more than mere rationality
when evidence is advanced in opposition to the purpose(s) of the
legislation.54
Moreover, Justice Marshall drew a parallel between his method of
eighth amendment analysis and the method of analysis used in striking
down legislation on the ground that it violates fourteenth amendment
concepts of substantive due process. In drawing the analogy, he set forth
" Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Physical
pain may be considered as well as severe mental pain. Id.
46 Id. at 274.
41 Id. at 277.
48 Id. at 282, 286.
4 Radin, supra note 21, at 1005.
'0 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
", Id. at 233.
52 Id. at 232. See Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, The Death Penalty, and The
Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171.
13 Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
5 In Gregg, evidence of deterrent value was presented, but Justice Marshall
attacked the statistics as unfounded without even considering whether the
legislature had a rational basis for its actions. 428 U.S. at 233-36.
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the following substantive due process argument which reiterates what
is essentially the primary purpose of the eighth amendment-to prohibit
punishment more severe than necessary to serve the state's legitimate
penological goals: "Because capital punishment deprives an individual of
a fundamental right (i.e., the right to life) .... the State needs a compel-
ling interest to justify it."55 Using that approach, the burden would be
upon the state to justify the legislation rather than requiring the defen-
dant to advance evidence in opposition to the statute.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist have consistently deferred
to state legislatures regarding capital punishment. 5' As a result, both
Justices are willing to uphold mandatory death penalty statutes57 and the
punishment of death for crimes not involving the death of the victim.58
Both Justices are also willing to uphold death sentences for felony murder
"even though the defendant did not actually kill or intend to kill his
victims." 9 However, Chief Justice Burger is more apt to entertain pro-
cedural attacks than Justice Rehnquist as evidenced by his decision in
11 Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 n.141. Chief Justice Burger would not accept the
least restrictive means analysis since any punishment could be subjected to such
a constitutional challenge. Id. at 395-96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938), Justice Black held that the
assistance of counsel is necessary to ensure the fundamental rights of life and
liberty. Life has been expressly recognized as a fundamental right by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 339
N.E.2d 676 (1975) (Tauro, C.J., concurring). Judge Tauro did not share Chief Justice
Burger's concern since the penalty of death is unique. Id. at 246 n.2, 339 N.E.2d
at 678 n.2. A person who receives a less severe sentence does retain some basic
rights. Id. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). One who is ex-
ecuted retains no rights. Where absolute deprivations are involved, courts allow
a more exacting scrutiny. O'Neal, 369 Mass. at 246 n.2, 339 N.E.2d at 678 n.2
(Tauro, C.J., concurring). See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973). Judge Tauro concluded that "the compelling State interest and
least restrictive means analysis is particularly congruent with the absolute and
irreversible deprivation resulting from a mandatory death penalty, whereas the
less absolute features of routine punishments do not demand, and will not be
given, such exacting scrutiny." O'Neal, 369 Mass. at 246 n.2, 339 N.E.2d at 678
n.2 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). See generally Fletcher, The Right to Life, 13 GA. L.
REV. 137 (1979) (development of theory refuting the argument that aggressors
forfeit their right to life).
56 Furman, 408 U.S. at 404-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 465-70 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). See Radin, supra note 21, at 1004.
" Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 306-07 (1976) (White, J., with whom
the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, dissenting); Id. at 308 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 337-39 (1976) (White,
J., with whom the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist joined, dissenting).
58 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 604 (1977) (Burger, C.J., with whom Mr.
Justice Rehnquist joined, dissenting).
" Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. .. . 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3392 (1982) (O'Con-
nor, J., with whom the Chief Justice, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist joined,
dissenting).
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Lockett where he held that the failure to permit consideration of all
mitigating factors during the sentencing phase in a capital case violated
the eighth and fourteenth amendments.0
Justice Rehnquist has uniformly exercised and advocated judicial
restraint. He finds it less serious to err on the side of deference to
legislative judgments, even when the rights of an individual are concerned,
so that the right of the people to govern themselves is preserved and
saved from the judicial activism of a majority of the Court.6' As a result,
Justice Rehnquist will reject challenges to capital punishment both
substantively and procedurally utilizing cruel and unusual punishment
arguments62 as well as due process 3 and equal protection64 arguments.
Justices Stevens and Powell have adopted a moderately active approach
in scrutinizing death penalty statutes. While deferring to the legislatures
in finding that the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se, both
Justices accord active judicial review to the procedural aspects of the
sentencing system.' In addition, regarding the punishment itself, in Coker
v. Georgia," in an opinion written by Justice White in which Justice
Stevens joined, execution for the crime of rape was found to be dispropor-
tionate to the crime and therefore inappropriate. It was stated that even
taking into account the attitudes and actions of the legislatures and the
sentencing juries, the ultimate decision as to the acceptability of the death
penalty resides with the Court.67 Justice Powell in Coker also expressed
the view that final resolution of death penalty punishments for certain
crimes rests with the judiciary. 8
Justice White, moderately active since Gregg,9 while rejecting a due
process fundamental fairness attack on the entire system,"0 will examine
death penalty statutes procedurally and substantively under the eighth
amendment.7' In Enmund v. Florida,"2 Justice White embraced the prin-
60 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
", Furman, 408 U.S. at 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 465.
63 Id. at 469-70.
04 Id. at 470.
65 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
66 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
67 Id. at 597.
6" Id. at 603 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
Radin, supra note 21, at 1008.
69 Compare Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 355 (1976) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (the judiciary should accept the reasonable conclusions of the legislature)
with Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (in the end the Court must decide
the acceptability of the death penalty under the eighth amendment). See Radin,
supra note 21, at 1002-04.
70 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
", Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
72 458 U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3368 (1982).
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ciple that the Court is to be the ultimate arbiter of the acceptability of
the death penalty as a punishment 3 without reference to whether the
state legislature had acted irrationally in permitting the sentence of death
for the crime of felony murder for one who did not kill or intend to kill.
Even though Justice White accepts the death penalty as an effective
deterrent for murder, he accepts the notion that when it is infrequently
imposed, the punishment loses its deterrent value. 4 Therefore, Justice
White would presumably be willing to look not only at the face and
substance of a particular statute, but to the effect of enacted statutes to
measure that effect upon legislative goals. A statute that merely bears
a rational relation to a state interest, but does not demonstrate a nondeter-
rent element in its imposition, would not survive Justice White's scrutiny.
The result of this type of review is similar to that espoused by Justice
Marshall.
Justice Blackmun, although expressing his personal opposition to the
death penalty,"5 clothed his dissent in Furman with deference to the
legislature and would not strike down capital punishment per se."6
However, Justice Blackumn is willing to recognize limitations upon
legislative authority. For example, in Coker, he agreed that it was
disproportionate to sentence one to death for committing the crime of
rape when no life was taken." Moreover, in Lockett, Justice Blackmun
expressly recognized that there are occasions where the Court must in-
terfere with the legislative judgment of the states by "setting some limit
to the method by which the States assess punishment for actions less
immediately connected to the deliberate taking of human life."7" Justice
Blackmun prescribed no test to measure legislative decisions, but the
Lockett opinion is indicative of his willingness to disengage himself from
a strict adherence to a legislative deference/mere rationality scheme.
Justice O'Connor first expressed concern over the procedural aspect
of death penalty cases in Eddings v. Oklahoma."9 In that case she concurred
in remanding for consideration of all factors of Eddings' background in
deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Her purpose in remanding
was to eliminate the risk of imposing the death penalty despite possible
mitigating factors which might justify a less severe penalty."0 While not
directly involved in deciding the constitutionality of capital punishment
per se,s' Justice O'Connor is willing to review a sentencing procedure
, Id. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 3376; 433 U.S. at 597.
4 Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76 Id.
17 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
8 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 616 (1978) (Blackmun, J. concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
71 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982).
80 Id. at 119.
8 Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion in Eddings in remanding, but
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to "ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded pro-
cess that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence
was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice or mistake."82 Her
scrutiny is careful and deliberate as evidenced by her dissenting opinion
in Enmund.83 Even though she disagreed with the majority's opinion that
a death sentence was disproportionate to the crime of felony murder,
Justice O'Connor urged remand because the trial judge's view of the facts
effectively prevented consideration of the defendant's mitigating
circumstance. 4 Justice O'Connor is therefore willing to actively protect
procedural fairness.
While it is virtually impossible to synchronize the various concepts
which have evolved into eighth amendment analyses, it is possible to
predict a certain amount of active judicial review for procedural aspects
of death penalty statute applications. Procedural attacks, therefore, will
be the turning point for Ohio's new statute.
When the issue of whether Ohio's death penalty statute is constitu-
tional reaches the Supreme Court, only Justices Brennan and Marshall
will oppose it since they both find the death penalty cruel and unusual
punishment. 5 Justice Rehnquist, exercising judicial restraint, will un-
doubtedly uphold Ohio's statute.86 Justice Blackmun will probably uphold
Ohio's statute since the constitutional infirmities he pointed out in Lockett
v. Ohio" have been corrected. For example, an aider or abettor to a felony
may no longer be sentenced to death without having intended to cause
the death of another88 and without the character of the offender's mens
stated in her concurring opinion that the majority opinion did not alter previous
Supreme Court decisions "establishing the constitutionality of the death penalty
*. ." Id. Moreover, six months after Eddings was decided, Justice O'Connor
"conclude[d] that the death penalty [was] not disproportionate to the crime of
felony murder, even though the defendant did not actually kill or intend to kill
his victims." Enmund, 458 U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 3392 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
It is evident, therefore, that Justice O'Connor concurs with the majority that
the death penalty as a form of punishment is neither cruel nor unusual.
82 455 U.S. at 118 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
458 U.S. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 3379 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 3394. The trial judge believed that the defendant
shot both victims to eliminate them as witnesses. This erroneous belief prevented
the trial judge from considering in mitigation of the death penalty that defen-
dant's role in the capital felonies was minor since he was in the getaway car
when the victims were shot. Defendant offered no other mitigating factors. Id.
at __, 102 S.Ct. at 3393-94.
85 See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
88 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
817 438 U.S. 586, 613-19 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2903.01(D) (Page 1982). Other state statutes requir-
ing some form of intent include: ALA. CODE S 13A-2-23, 13A-5-40(a)(2),
13A-6-2(a)(1) (1982); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, SS 9-1(a)(3), 9-1(b)(6) (1979); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:30(1) (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1(A)(2),
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rea being considered by the sentencer. 89 Additionally, no longer is it possi-
ble for only the defendant who elects a jury trial to be sentenced to death.
Even those pleading guilty may be candidates for the death penalty."
There is a possibility for swaying Justice Blackmun. Ohio's new statute
contains an aggravating circumstance which permits imposition of death
for the killing of a peace officer when the defendant knew of the victim's
identity or when the defendant had only reasonable cause to know the
victim's identity." Thus, the aggravating circumstances may apply when
the defendant is negligent. While Justice Blackmun did not require an
actual intent to kill, but only that the character of the mens rea be allowed
to be considered, an analogy to the peace officer aggravating circumstance
is useful and applicable as follows. Once the aggravating circumstance
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether knowledge, recklessness
or negligence is shown, there is no specific mitigating factor for the jury
to consider regarding the actual state of the offender's mens rea as in
the case of the felony aider or abettor. Once the jury finds that the defen-
dant did not know the victim's identity but had reasonable cause to know
the victim's identity, it is doubtful that the jury will consider any further
mens rea arguments even though such factors may be "relevant to the
issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death."92 This type
of argument may again trigger Justice Blackmun to set a "limit to the
method by which . . . [Ohio] assess[es] punishment .... .93
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Stevens, and O'Con-
nor are receptive to procedural attacks. 4 Because the new statute com-
plies with earlier Supreme Court decisions involving basic procedural
issues, original issues need to be raised to trigger the scrutiny of these
Justices.
With procedural attacks as a starting point, efforts may again turn to
constitutional scrutiny of death as a form of punishment. It may prove
impossible to construct a procedurally sound death penalty statute which
does not violate the mandates of Furman95 even with the inclusion of ag-
gravating circumstances. An example of such an outcome becomes ap-
parent in scrutinizing the aggravating circumstances in Ohio's death
penalty statute.
31-18-14(A), 31-20A-5 (1978 & Supp. 1981); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ss 19.02(a),
19.03(a)(2) (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-202(1) (1978); VA. CODE S 18.2-31(d) (1982).
For a discussion of state and federal felony murder sentences see Enmund, 458
U.S. ., 102 S.Ct. at 3368 (1982).
9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(B)(6) (Page 1982).
9 Id. S 2929.02(A).
91 Id. § 2929.04(A)(6).
92 Id. § 2929.04(B)(7).
" Lockett, 438 U.S. at 616.
9' See supra notes 60, 65-74, 79-84 and accompanying text.
15 438 U.S. at 623 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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IV. EVALUATION OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Two basic approaches can be utilized in scrutinizing legislative choices
of aggravating circumstances: (1) an individual examination, where each
aggravating circumstance is attacked on constitutional grounds such as
overbroadness or vagueness; and (2) an aggregate examination, 9 where
the aggravating circumstances are analyzed as a whole to determine the
aggregate effect on who will eventually be considered for death. For ex-
ample, do the aggravating circumstances as a whole significantly disad-
vantage a suspect class or economically-disadvantaged people so that the
risk of death is significantly higher for only certain groups of people?
In effect, the individualized approach will result in only a specific portion
of the entire statute being declared invalid; whereas, the aggregate
analysis will impact upon the entire statute.
A. Individual Examination
The aggravating circumstances of Ohio's death penalty statute are:
assassination of various political officials, officials-elect, or candidates,"
murder for hire, 8 murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial, or
Two subcategories can be established within the aggregate examination:
(1) consideration of the total aggravating circumstances separate and distinct from
the entire sentencing statute; or (2) consideration of the total aggravating cir-
cumstances as a comprehensive part of the sentencing statute. For purposes of
the instant evaluation, the distinction is not relevant. It becomes relevant, however,
when addressing an attack on the system as a whole and when addressing such
attack on varied grounds. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the petitioner
argued that there was "an unconstitutional amount of discretion in the system
which separates those suspects who receive the death penalty from those who
receive life imprisonment, a lesser penalty, or are acquitted or never charged
. ...." Id  at 225-26. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, rejected this challenge
as not having constitutional merit. Id. at 226. The simple "assertion of lack of
faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally fair
manner" does not justify interference "with the manner in which Georgia has
chosen to enforce [its] laws .... " Id. In Gregg, the attack was not targeted at
any particular portion of the statute. Instead, the attack was one of open-ended
discretion based upon the entire system, both statutory and nonstatutory, as deny-
ing fundamental fairness as opposed to a narrower attack on many grounds.
" The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States
or a person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor
or lieutenant governor of this state, or of the president-elect or vice
president-elect of the United States, or the governor-elect or lieutenant
governor-elect of this state, or of a candidate for any of the foregoing
offices. For purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if he has
been nominated for election according to law, or if he has filed a petition
or petitions according to law to have his name placed on the ballot in
a primary or general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate
in a primary or general election.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(A)(1) (Page 1982).
" "The offense was committed for hire." Id. S 2929.04(A)(2).
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punishment for another offense,9 murder while a prisoner,"' murder with
a prior conviction for attempted murder or murder,' °1 murder endanger-
ing two or more people,0 2 murder of a peace officer,103 felony murder,0 4
and murder of a witness.0 5
It is difficult to examine individually each aggravating circumstance
in the abstract. A bare analysis, however, is set forth below utilizing four
of the aggravating circumstances."' The felony murder specification is
discussed because it will probably be the most frequently charged cir-
cumstance. The other three specifications involve victim identities and
are discussed to illustrate the wide variability among them.
9 "The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehen-
sion, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender." Id.
§ 2929.04(A)(3).
"00 "The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a deten-
tion facility as defined in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code." Id. S 2929.04(A)(4).
101 Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was convicted of an offense an
essential element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to
kill another, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involv-
ing the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by
the offender.
Id. S 2929.04(A)(5).
102 Id.
103 The victim of the offense was a peace officer, as defined in section
2935.01 of the Revised Code, whom the offender had reasonable cause
to know or knew to be such, and either the victim, at the time of the
commission of the offense, was engaged in his duties or it was the of-
fender's specific purpose to kill a peace officer.
Id. § 2929.04(A)(6).
'0' The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempt-
ing to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting
to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or
aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender
in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal of-
fender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and
design.
Id. S 2929.04(A)(7).
105 The victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who
was purposely killed to prevent his testimony in any criminal proceeding
and the aggravated murder was not committed during the commission,
attempted commission, or flight immediately after the commission or at-
tempted commission of the offense to which the victim was a witness
or the victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense and
was purposely killed in retaliation for his testimony in any criminal
proceeding.
Id. S 2929.04(A)(8).
106 Professor Lawrence Herman raised a constitutional challenge to a fifth ag-
gravating circumstance, when aggravated murder is committed by a prisoner in
a detention facility. THE OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE, OHIO DEATH
PENALTY MANUAL 11-19-25 (1981).
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1. Aggravating by Victim
a. Political Official
One of the ways an offender may become a candidate for the death
penalty in Ohio is to murder a particular political official, official-elect,
or candidate."7 Only California"8 and Tennessee"9 have aggravating cir-
cumstances defined in terms of political offices, not including the offices
of prosecutors or judges. However, Ohio is the only state which makes
the identity of a political figure alone suffice to condemn a person to death.
For example, California requires the death to be "intentionally carried
out in retaliation for or to prevent the performance of the victim's of-
ficial duties."'1 0 Tennessee requires not only a causal connection between
the death and "the official's lawful duties or status"1 '1 but also knowledge
on the part of the defendant that "the victim was such an official." '2 The
Ohio aggravating circumstance does not require either knowledge of the
identity of the political official beforehand or a purpose to serve as a causal
connection for the death of the official." 3 Thus, this aggravating specifica-
tion is unique among all the death penalty statutes in the United States.
Without requiring knowledge or purpose, from which knowledge may
be inferred, this criminal sentencing feature, which could lead to the death
of an individual sentenced thereunder, serves no penological goal. "The
death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."1 4 Because
retribution is no longer the dominant objective of criminal sentencing,11 '
10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(A)(1) (Page 1982).
'08 CAL. PENAL CODE S 190.2 (West Supp. 1982).
109 TENN. CODE ANN. 5 39-2404(i) (Supp. 1981).
110 CAL. PENAL CODE 190.2(a)(13) (West Supp. 1982).
, TENN. CODE ANN. 39-2404(i)(11) (Supp. 1981).
112 Id.
"1 Perhaps the knowledge requirement could even be inferred if a causal con-
nection was required.
114 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. Justice Marshall has recognized six conceivable pur-
poses for capital punishment: "retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive
criminal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and
economy." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
The penological goals in Ohio are to punish those convicted, to deter others from
committing crimes and to protect society. State v. Meyer, 163 Ohio St. 279, 287,
126 N.E.2d 585, 589 (1955). Another goal is to deter a convicted defendant from
further criminal activities. State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 19, 247 N.E.2d 293,
298 (1969).
11. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). Reformation and rehabilita-
tion are important goals; retribution is not the dominant objective. In re Lamb,
34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 88, 296 N.E.2d 280, 284 (1973) (quoting from Williams, 337
U.S. at 248).
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if the penalty does not deter,"' retribution alone should not suffice as
the reason for executing anyone." 7 If an offender takes the life of a vic-
tim without knowledge of the victim's identity or without knowledge that
the victim has filed a petition to run for an office, there is no deterrent
value to prospective offenders if the perpetrator is not cognizant of the
victim's identity, which identity is the sole criterion for imposing death.
Of the three Ohio aggravating circumstances based on the identity of
a victim, the political office specification is the only one which does not
require any additional proof beyond the identity of the victim. The other
two victim-defined specifications in Ohio's statute have required elements
of either knowledge or purpose or both to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt before they may be invoked for death penalty purposes. For exam-
ple, if a witness is killed, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
not only the identity of the victim as a witness to an offense, but also
that the witness was killed purposely to prevent his testimony or in retalia-
tion for his testimony."8 Additionally, if a peace officer is killed, the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only the identity of the victim
as a peace officer, but also that the offender knew or had reasonable cause
to know the victim was a peace officer, and either the victim was en-
gaged in his duties at the time he was killed or the offender specifically
had the purpose to kill a peace officer."9 Without requiring additional
proof beyond the identity of the victim, the legislature has, in effect,
11 Research indicates that capital punishment laws in Ohio do not deter
homicides in Ohio. Bailey, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty for Murder
in Ohio: A Time-Series Analysis, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1979). Further, the Ohio
legislature did not make any finding that capital punishment is a better deter-
rent than life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
THE OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE, OHIO DEATH PENALTY MANUAL 11-46
(1981). For a discussion of the empirical evidence supporting and refuting the
deterrent effect of the death penalty see Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An
Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 1177, 1196-1224 (1981).
.. Furman, 408 U.S. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring) (the legislature cannot
constitutionally pursue retribution as its sole justification for capital punishment);
see also id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (history demonstrates that society
harbors no desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them); cf. id. at 308
(Stewart, J., concurring) (retribution is a permissible ingredient in the imposition
of punishment); and id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (retribution is a legitimate
dimension of the punishment of crimes); but cf. id. at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("[wjhile retribution alone may seem an unworthy justification [for punishment]
in a moral sense, its utility in a system of criminal justice requiring public sup-
port has long been recognized"). See generally Lempert, Desert and Deterrence:
An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 1177 (1981) (analyses concluding that retribution cannot justify state ex-
ecutions and deterrence evidence is insufficient for capital punishment to with-
stand moral scrutiny).
118 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(A)(8) (Page 1982).
Id. S 2929.04(A)(6).
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decided that only these political officials are deserving of the highest
degree of possible protection, thus assuming some inherent deterrent
value. But again, deterrent value here is dubious. The risk of having a
victim identified later as a political official is low so that deterrence re-
mains low and therefore ineffective. Moreover, the argument is tenuous
that there is a presumption that the identities of these political officials
are known to all since the specification also includes a person, sometimes
virtually an unknown person, who files a petition to run for office. In
this context, a person who kills a candidate for the office of lieutenant
governor without knowing the victim's identity is more deserving of the
death penalty according to the state legislature than a person who, with
prior calculation and design, murders a young child on her way to school.
The latter offender might not even be eligible for the death penalty under
Ohio's law.
By focusing on the identity of the victim,'20 the legislature effectively
ignores the substance of the crime and any particular heinousness of the
offense.'"' For example, other than distinguishing between felonies and
misdemeanors, the legislature has not tried to deter burglaries on the
120 The following state statutes which enumerate aggravating circumstances
do not contain victim-defined specifications: ALA. CODE S 13A-5-49 (1982); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-703(F) (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 41-1303 (1977); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. S 53a-46a (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp.
1982); Miss. CODE ANN. S 99-19-101(5) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 630:5-II(a)
_(Supp. 1981).
M The following state statutes which enumerate aggravating circumstances
contain a specification (or specifications) which permits consideration of the
substance of the crime, including heinousness and/or torture: ALA. CODE S
13A-5-49(8) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-703(F)(6) (1978 & Supp. 1982-83);
CAL. PENAL CODE S 190.2(a)(18) (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. S
16-11-103(6)(i) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 53a-46a(g)(4) (West Supp. 1982); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, S 4209(e)(1), (n) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 921.141(5)(h) (West
Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. S 27-2534.1(b)(7) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE S
19-2515(f)(5), (6) (1979); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(g) (West Supp. 1982);
MISS. CODE ANN. S 99-19-101(5)(h) (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 565.012.2(7) (Ver-
non 1979 & Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. S 46-18-303(3) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
S 29-2523(1)(d) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. S 200.033(8) (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
630:5-II(a)(7) (Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 15A-2000(e)(9) (Supp. 1981); OKLA.
SWAT. ANN. tit. 21, S 701.12(4) (West 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 23A-27A-1(6) (Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. S 39-2404(i)(5) (Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. S 6-4-102(h)(vii) (1977 & Supp.
1982).
A broad and vague construction of Georgia's statute permitting the penalty
of death for murder offenses which are "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman" violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 (1980). Cf People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty., 31 Cal.
3d 797, 801, 647 P.2d 76, 79, 183 Cal. Rptr. 800, 801 (1982) (statutory special cir-
cumstances permitting death for murder that is "'especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity"' is unconstitutionally vague violating
due process standards).
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basis of the identity of the stolen goods by requiring longer sentences
for those stealing diamonds rather than stereos.
Obviously, all potential murderers pose a threat to society. But few
would disagree that as a first step toward reducing the crime of murder,
the murderer who purposely tortures his victim should be one of the first
for the legislature to try to deter with a death penalty statute. The
substance of that offense is especially heinous no matter who the victim is.
In addition, the murderer who plots and plans his offense should be
a potential candidate for a sentence of death. The murderer who plans
the crime may be the most easily deterred since he contemplates the in-
tended victim and the method of attack. Ohio has not required a death
sentence trial based on the substance of an offense utilizing prior calcula-
tion and design. The legislature has decided not to protect society at this
elevated level, but instead has decided to protect society from one who
murders a person who has filed a petition to run for an office regardless
of the murderer's knowledge of the victim's status. Since the legislature
has chosen to provide special protection for certain political officials,
officials-elect, and candidates, rather than focusing on the substance of
the crime, it would be advisable for the public to file petitions to run
for office to obtain the desired protection from potential murderers. This
result is irrational. The legislature should be required to consider the
substance or heinousness of a crime and the effective deterrent value
of the punishment to be inflicted before condemning a person to death.
b. Peace Officer
Another aggravating circumstance provides special protection for peace
officers. 2 Justification for the inclusion of the murder of peace officers
as an aggravating circumstance in death penalty statutes has been ex-
pressly recognized by the Supreme Court in Roberts v. Louisiana.'2 3 The
Court found "a special interest in affording protection to these public ser-
vants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(A)(6) (Page 1982). A peace officer includes:
A sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, member of the organ-
ized police department of any municipal corporation, state university law
enforcement officer appointed under section 3345.04 of the Revised Code,
a police constable of any township, and, for the purpose of arrests within
those areas, and for the purposes of Chapter 5503 of the Revised Code,
and the filing of and service of process relating to those offenses witnessed
or investigated by them, includes the superintendent and patrolmen of
the state highway patrol.
Id. S 2935.01(B).
,2 431 U.S. 633 (1977). In Roberts, the Court affirmed its decision in Stanislaus
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), that a mandatory death penalty statute
violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments since such a statute does not
allow for consideration of particularized mitigating factors in deciding whether
the death sentence should be imposed. The fact that Harry Roberts killed a police
officer did not change the Court's position as to mandatory death penalties.
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21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
of other persons and property."'24 In fact, four members of the Court found
that a mandatory death sentence for the killing of a peace officer was
justified. '25 A broad attack, therefore, on the ground of the peace officer
status alone is virtually moot.
This section can be challenged, however, on the basis of its substance;
it permits a defendant to be executed not only for knowing of the official
identity of the victim, but also for his negligence in this respect, i.e., when
a defendant should be aware that the victim is a peace officer.'" In this
context, it is not the crime of aggravated murder alone which could justify
the imposition of death, but the possible recklessness of shooting an under-
cover policeman which would trigger the death penalty.
This is the only aggravating circumstance where a negligence standard
has been specifically incorporated to justify a sentence of death. If the
eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"'27 the punish-
ment of death for negligently being unaware of someone's identity ex-
ceeds contemporary societal boundaries of decency. Killing a police of-
ficer, knowing he is a police officer, is more reprehensible than killing
a police officer without knowledge of his identity.
Moreover, because the state must prove the negligence standard beyond
a reasonable doubt,' 8 in effect, the state is also proving that there is no
deterrent value in executing a particular offender for a negligent state
124 431 U.S. at 636. Policemen on the beat are exposed, in the service of society,
to all the risks entailed in preventing crime and apprehending criminals. "Because
these people are literally the foot soldiers of society's defense of ordered liberty,
the State has an especial interest in their protection." Id. at 646-47 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
12 Chief Justice Burger dissented on the basis of his dissent in Stanislaus
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). Roberts, 431 U.S. at 638. Justice
Blackmun, with whom Justices White and Rehnquist joined in dissent, found that
the killing of a peace officer falls within the narrow category of homicide for
which a mandatory death sentence is constitutional. Id. at 641. Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Justice White joined in dissent, found that "the arguments weighing
in favor of society's determination to impose a mandatory sentence for the murder
of a police officer in the line of duty are far stronger than in the case of an or-
dinary homicide." Id. at 643.
Louisiana made it a crime to be punished by death when the offender possessed
"a specific intent to kill ... a peace officer who was engaged in the performance
of his lawful duties." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14:30(2) (West 1974).
1 THE OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE, OHIO DEATH PENALTY MANUAL
11-25 (1981). Significantly, only five of thirty-three states with death penalty
statutes include a negligence standard for peace officers: CAL. PENAL CODE S
190.2(a)(7) (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 9-1(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982); NEV. REV. STAT. S 200.033(7) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2404(i)(9) (Supp.
1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 9A.32.045(1) (1977).
1 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666 (1962).
2' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(A) (Page 1982).
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of mind as to his victim's identity. If an offender is unaware of the identity
of his victim, and that is the determining factor for whether death can
be imposed, without such knowledge there is nothing from which to deter.
The negligence standard, therefore, serves nothing more than a
retributive function. That purpose alone may not suffice as a reason for
execution.'" If the reason for listing the killing of peace officers as an
aggravating circumstance is to afford "protection to these public
servants,"1 " the inclusion of a negligence standard does not serve the
legislative purpose.
c. Witness
The last victim-defined aggravating circumstance is written to provide
special protection for witnesses willing to testify and for witnesses who
have already testified."' Unlike the other two victim-defined aggravating
circumstances discussed above, this specification requires a more exact-
ing burden of proof. Not only must the identity of the victim as a witness
to an offense be established, but it must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the witness was purposely killed for specific reasons, i.e., to
prevent testimony or in retaliation for testimony. When a witness to an
offense has been killed to prevent testimony, there is the additional limita-
tion that the aggravated murder not be committed immediately before,
during or after the offense to which the victim was a witness.
This latter limitation has the implied significance of preventing overlap-
ping of the aggravating circumstances themselves to obviate the automatic
cumulation of factors against a defendant."2 In this way, arbitrary and
capricious decisions are reduced because the likelihood that a particular
sentence of death will be excessive in comparison to similar cases is
substantially decreased. The limitation, however, was not written into
other aggravating circumstances, but its express inclusion in this one
denotes an awareness of the problem of cumulation by the legislature
and should be urged to apply to all the aggravating circumstances so they
may comply with the constitutional procedural fairness requirements of
the eighth amendment.1"
The language of this aggravating circumstance is overbroad and vague.
There is no language defining or limiting "witness to an offense."
' u
Therefore, this phrase could apply to a lifetime in which one offense or
' See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
130 Roberts, 431 U.S. at 636.
131 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(A)(8) (Page 1982).
132 State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 28, 257 S.E.2d 569, 587 (1979).
133 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
13 Offense is defined in conjunction with Chapter 2935 to include "felonies,
misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances of municipal corporations and other
public bodies authorized by law to adopt penal regulations." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. S 2935.01(D) (Page 1982).
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many offenses may have been witnessed. The only nexus between the
"witness to an offense" and the defendant is that the witness be killed
to prevent testimony in any criminal proceeding, but not the specific pro-
ceeding taking place at the time of the witness' death. In other words,
there is no requirement that the offense witnessed have any connection
with the criminal proceeding under way or a criminal proceeding against
the particular defendant at any time.
There is also no limitation that the offense witnessed be one in which
the defendant partook. Perhaps this will be advantageous to a defendant
in that it will be more difficult for the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the purpose of the killing where there is no nexus to the defen-
dant. However, proof advantages should not foreclose a declaration of
unconstitutionality based on overbroadness or vagueness, especially when
the outcome is life determinative.
Additionally, the victim who did not witness an offense, but who was
killed to prevent testimony, is not covered by this section. There is also
no protection afforded the witness to an offense who is killed to prevent
testimony in a civil proceeding. The circumstance is thus underinclusive.
Because this circumstance presents vagueness, overbroadness and
underinclusiveness problems, a court should be urged to adopt the nar-
rowest interpretation. Ohio has codified the rule of strict construction,
not only for the defining of offenses, but also for the defining of penalties.",
Requiring a nexus between the offense witnessed and the defendant for
which there is a reasonable time lapse would satisfy the statutory strict
construction requirement.
2. Aggravated by Felony
Another aggravating circumstance is to commit aggravated murder dur-
ing the commission of certain enumerated felonies." This aggravating
circumstance may be unconstitutional since it inflicts the penalty of death
upon a principal in a felony murder based upon the felony murder itself;
whereas, before a principal in a premeditated, cold-blooded aggravated
murder can be capitally tried, an additional aggravating factor must be
proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. 137 The scenario is set forth
below.
The two forms of aggravated murder in Ohio are: (1) the purposeful
killing of another with prior calculation and design;'36 and (2) the purposeful
" "Sections of the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly
construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused." OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. S 2901.04(A) (Page 1982).
136 Id. S 2929.04(A)(7).
137 THE OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE, OHIO DEATH PENALTY MANUAL
11-25-27 (1981).
'13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2903.01(A) (Page 1982).
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killing of another during the commission of a felony. '39 Prior calculation
and design is not statutorily defined; however, the Supreme Court of Ohio
has stated that:
Prior calculation and design means that the purpose to kill was
reached by a definite process of reasoning in advance of the kill-
ing which process of reasoning must have included a mental plan
involving studied consideration of the method and the means or
instrument with which to kill another.
No definite period of time must elapse and no particular amount
of consideration must be given to the prior calculation and design
to kill. Acting on the spur of the moment or after momentary
consideration of the purpose to kill is not sufficient to constitute
the kind of prior calculation and design required for aggravated
murder. However, neither the degree of care nor the length of
time the offender takes to ponder the crime beforehand are critical
factors in themselves, but they must amount to more than momen-
tary deliberation. 40
Offender A commits aggravated murder in a well-planned, cold-blooded
fashion. Before he can be capitally tried, one of eight additional new fac-
tors must be alleged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Offender B commits aggravated murder during the commission
of a felony. On that fact alone, Offender B can be capitally tried without
any additional proof of any new factor since felony murder is itself one
of the eight aggravating circumstances. If the state proves that element
beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt phase of the trial, that element
automatically carries over to the penalty phase of the trial as a given
for the state. None of the aggravating factors include elements of the
offense committed with prior calculation and design; all of the aggravating
circumstances introduce new factors when a person is indicted under the
prior calculation and design form of aggravated murder. Thus, the prin-
cipal in a felony murder is afforded harsher treatment than the principal
in a premeditated, cold-blooded killing.
The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."'41 A classification of aggravated murder has been established
which subjects its perpetrators to a particular punishment. All aggravated
murderers are subject to the maximum sentence of life imprisonment with
eligibility for parole in twenty years"4 absent aggravating factors unless
139 Id. § 2903.01(B.
140 State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St. 2d 281, 286-87, 414 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (1980).
See State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St. 2d 74, 388 N.E.2d 755 (1979); State v. Cotton,
56 Ohio St. 2d 8, 381 N.E.2d 190 (1978).
141 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
142 OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(A) (Page 1982).
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an offender is within the subclassification of felony murder. Because felony
murder is both an element of the substantive offense and an aggravating
factor, it automatically subjects the offender to the maximum penalty of
death or life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until either twenty
or thirty years. 1
3
The classification itself is not in question. " It reasonably promotes the
governmental purpose of protecting its citizenry by classifying certain
conduct inapposite to an orderly society. The disparate treatment of those
within the class subject to the death penalty warrants judicial review.
The state should be called upon to justify why the premeditating cold-
blooded killer is less culpable and therefore is not to be sentenced to death
when the principal in a felony murder is.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina met this type of a challenge in
State v. Cherry"' where the defendant was convicted of first degree felony
murder and was sentenced to death. The court held that since the possibil-
ity of being sentenced to death was disproportionately higher for those
convicted of felony murder than those convicted of a premeditated kill-
ing due to the automatic aggravating circumstance, the underlying felony
could not be submitted to the jury as an aggravating circumstance."6 The
court found it highly incongruous that a defendant convicted of a felony
murder will have one aggravating circumstance pending for no other
reason than the nature of the conviction while a defendant convicted of
a premeditated and deliberate killing will have no strikes against him
based upon the nature of his offense." 7
What the Ohio legislature has done, in effect, is to elevate felony murder
into a capital offense in and of itself while for other killings with aggrava-
tion, additional factors must be present before the offense becomes a
capital one. Such disparate treatment between felony murder and pre-
meditated murder defendants is wholly unjustified. The offender who
carefully plans to kill another is arguably more blameworthy than a per-
son who, during the course of a robbery or flight therefrom, pulls the
trigger because he has panicked. The deterrent value would seem to be
greater to protect society from those who will take the time to carefully
plot a murder.
The two subclasses of aggravated murderers should be subjected to
similar treatment when such a fundamental right is at stake. Because
an essential element of the crime is not an aggravating circumstance for
143 Id. S 2929.03(D)(2).
"' The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not prevent
a state legislature from recognizing degrees of evil. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
43 (1915). See Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915).
141 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). See State
v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 14-15, 257 S.E.2d 569, 579 (1979).
.,. 298 N.C. at 113, 257 S.E.2d at 567-68.
147 Id.
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an aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, the underlying
felony which is an essential element of the crime of felony murder should
not be submitted to the jury as an aggravating circumstance.
B. In the Aggregate
Following Furman, legislatures began narrowing the class of murderers
subject to the death penalty by incorporating aggravating circumstances
into their capital punishment statutes to be considered with mitigating
factors to guide jury discretion. When the death penalty statutes were
upheld in Florida,"8 Georgia "9 and Texas, and struck down in Louisiana"'
and North Carolina,"' the other state legislatures had models for their
own statutes. The majority of states adopted the listing of specific ag-
gravating circumstances."' Each state, however, has fashioned its own
specific aggravating circumstances so that most of the statutes vary
significantly.
When the form of statutes listing aggravating circumstances passed
constitutional muster, the Court admitted that just because another state's
statute is modeled after the ones declared constitutional, it does not
necessarily mean that it too will satisfy the concerns of Furman."4 The
Court stated that "each distinct system must be examined on an individual
basis."'55 With that in mind, it is appropriate to scrutinize the aggravating
circumstances in Ohio's death penalty statute as a whole. Do the clear
and objective standards, which are provided to guide jury discretion, pro-
duce discriminatory results? It is proffered that Ohio's statutory ag-
gravating circumstances will have a disproportionate impact on the black
racial minority and economically-disadvantaged people"7 in that those peo-
ple will be executed most often or exclusively under Ohio's statute.
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
"' Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
"' Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
... Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
"' See supra note 14.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
155 Id.
"' Justice Marshall indicated that despite clear and objective standards, the
death penalty is still imposed disproportionately upon racial minorities. Godfrey
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 (1980) (Marshall, J., with whom Justice Brennan
joined, concurring).
"' Although the economically-disadvantaged have not been recognized as a
suspect class for equal protection analysis, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the fact remains that "[tihe disgraceful distorting
effects of racial discrimination and poverty continue to be painfully visible in the
imposition of death sentences." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., with whom Justice Brennan joined, concurring) (emphasis added) (foot-
note omitted). See Richards, Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the
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In order to subject a law to equal protection scrutinization, the law
must classify people in some manner. A classification may then
discriminate in one of three ways." First, a statute may discriminate on
its face.' 59 Second, a statute may discriminate in its application although
neutral on its face. 6 ' Third, a statute may be neutral on its face, be ap-
plied evenhandedly, but have a disadvantaging effect on racial minorities. 6'
In this latter category, a showing of disproportionate impact alone will
not suffice. A discriminatory intent or purpose must be shown.6 2
Ohio's aggravating circumstances do not discriminate on their face. They
do not, for example, permit only Caucasians who commit aggravated
murder for hire to be considered for the death penalty. The other two
forms of discrimination are possible, however, under Ohio's statute.
Even though neutral on their face, the aggravating circumstances may
be discriminatory in their application. Generally, this is shown through
the administration of the law by those whose responsibility it is to en-
force the law. Death penalty statutes afford great discretion to the pro-
secutor who decides whether to charge a defendant with a capital crime.
Not all aggravated murderers are subject to the death penalty; only those
who are charged with an aggravating circumstance may be considered
for death." The Court, however, is not amenable to an argument based
on the assumption of improper prosecutorial discretion in the charging
phase or plea bargaining process.'64 It does not violate the Constitution
when an offender is removed from consideration as a candidate for the
death penalty. 6' What the Court fails to acknowledge is that there is no
process by which a prosecutor's discretion need be guided. That discre-
tion, which could ultimately mean death to a particular offender, is totally
unchecked and could be based on purely racist motives or purposes totally
immaterial to the ends of justice and penological theories of punishment.'66
Substantive Criminal Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395, 1444-45 (1979). See also THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 351 (H.A. BEDAU 3d ed. 1982) (the economically poor
are sentenced to death discriminately).
"I J.E. NOWAK, R.D. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, ch. 16, at 597 (1978).
"' Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
'80 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
,61 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
162 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See Rogers v. Herman Lodge,
458 U.S. __, 102 S.Ct. at 3272 (1982).
163 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Page 1982).
164 "Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will
be motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the strength of
their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it
convicts." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 199 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
166 V.L. SWIGERT & R.A. FARRELL, MURDER, INEQUALITY, AND THE LAW (1976).
Black and economically disadvantaged individuals whose behavior and appearance
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Ohio's statute permits such unchecked discretion to exist and flourish.
One of the concerns in Furman was unevenhanded application. '67 The
unevenhanded application in Furman was found to occur as a result of
arbitrary and capricious sentencing by juries without guidelines. One of
the ways to avoid unevenhanded application is to provide automatic ap-
pellate review. The reviewing court can then determine whether similarly
situated defendants are receiving the death sentence in like situations.
By comparing death penalty cases a court can ascertain whether there
is evenhanded administration.
Ohio's statute provides for such a tracking mechanism. The Ohio
supreme court is to receive notice within fifteen days of the filing of a
capital indictment.'68 If a defendant pleads guilty or no contest, or if the
indictment is dismissed, the supreme court again receives notice of such
action within fifteen days."6 9 Additionally, the court, or the panel of three
judges if tried without a jury, must file an opinion with the court of ap-
peals and the supreme court when it imposes sentence. The court or panel
must detail why the aggravating circumstances were found to outweigh
the mitigating circumstances in the case of death or why the aggravating
circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances in the case
of life imprisonment. 0 Then, upon appeal,"' the court of appeals and the
supreme court, in determining whether death is appropriate, must con-
sider "whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases."'7 2
What the Ohio system fails to track are aggravated murder cases which
could have been capitally tried but which the prosecutor decided not to
charge as such."3 The Ohio tracking system only checks those cases which
have begun passage through the death penalty system. Before a thorough
examination can be made as to discriminatory application, a comprehen-
sive tracking system is needed for all aggravated murders containing ag-
identify them with the criminal image are selected out for differential treatment.
Id. at 69. See Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The
Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456, 467 (1981).
167 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.021(A) (Page 1982).
169 Id. S 2929.021(B).
10 Id. S 2929.03(F).
11 The defendant has a right to review by the district court of appeals if a
death sentence is imposed at the trial level and, if affirmed, a defendant has a
right of review by the Supreme Court of Ohio. OHIO CONST. art. IV, S 2(B)(2)(a)(ii).
172 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (Page 1982).
... Professor Lawrence Herman has noted other defects in Ohio's tracking
system. For example, no notice is required when a jury imposes a life sentence
or when an appellate court sets aside a death sentence as inappropriate. No re-
quirement exists that an appellate court be notified of capital indictments filed
within its territorial jurisdiction. THE OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE, OHIO
DEATH PENALTY MANUAL 11-14-17 (1981).
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gravating circumstances, even those which a prosecutor decides not to
capitally charge. Because a discriminatory administration can occur at
this initial stage which could result in an individual's life being taken by
the state, special care must be afforded at all stages of the process.174
The elimination of unfettered jury discretion does not remove unfettered
discretion from the entire system. The initial phase of deciding whether
to seek a capital indictment is wrought with unfettered discretion. The
prosecuting authorities should either be required to charge a capital of-
fense whenever there is a capital murder or be required to comply with
a comprehensive tracking process. In this way, capital murders not
charged as such could be reviewed along with capitally-charged murders.
The reviewing courts would have all the information available to them
to decide whether any individual or any class of individuals have been
discriminated against in the application of Ohio's death penalty statute.
The capital sentencing scheme in Ohio, absent the tracking of capital
cases not charged as such, is fundamentally unfair. The scheme constitutes
a denial of due process because the system provides and espouses that
an individual will not be put to death where others in similar situations
have been permitted to live. The Supreme Court has acknowledged an
obligation to reexamine sentencing procedures against evolving standards
of procedural fairness. 7 5 The sentencing process, as well as the trial itself,
must satisfy due process requirements. 6 In Gardner v. Florida,'77 the
petitioner was sentenced to death by the trial judge after a jury recom-
mended life on the basis of confidential information contained in a
presentence report not disclosed to him or his counsel. The Court found
the state's justifications 171 unwarranted to deprive a person of life. One
of the arguments presented by the state was that the trial judges of
Florida could be trusted to exercise their discretion in a responsible man-
174 Capital punishment has consistently been recognized as requiring special
consideration by the Court. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972).
175 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-73, 179-81 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. at 299-300 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-203 (1971);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
176 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
177 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
178 The state of Florida offered the following justifications:
(i) an assurance of confidentiality is necessary to enable investigators
to obtain relevant but sensitive disclosures about a defendant's
background or character; (ii) full disclosure of a presentence report will
unnecessarily delay the proceeding; (iii) such full disclosure, which often
includes psychiatric and psychological evaluations, will occasionally
disrupt the rehabilitation process; and (iv) trial judges can be trusted
to exercise their sentencing discretion in a responsible manner, even
though their decisions may be based on secret information.
Id. at 349-50.
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ner, even though they may base their decisions on confidential
information. 9 The Court found that argument foreclosed by its decision
in Furman.'
Two aspects of Gardner can be analogized and made applicable to Ohio's
death penalty statute. The first is that if it cannot be assumed that a
trial court will exercise discretion in a responsible manner, then there
is no basis for assuming that a prosecutor will act in a responsible man-
ner when deciding who will be capitally charged. The second is that in
order for a reviewing court to determine whether a state's capital senten-
cing procedure is administered with an even hand, it is essential that
the reviewing court have the complete record of all similar cases before
it, and this should include those cases of capital status which are not so
charged. Otherwise, the cases considered are unreliable and will produce
invalid decisions since the cases will not represent the entire population
of capitally-triable cases.
The second manner in which Ohio's death penalty denies equal protec-
tion is that even though neutral on its face and assuming evenhanded
application, it has a disadvantaging effect on racial minorities. This type
of discrimination is difficult to prove because a discriminatory purpose
must be found. Discriminatory impact alone is not determinative; the Court
must look to other evidence. 8 '
The aggravating circumstances listed by Ohio will most likely result
in black defendants, as well as economically-disadvantaged defendants,
being executed in significantly disproportionate numbers. Because of social
pressures, some of which are state-induced, it is inevitable that the par-
ticular types of circumstances adopted will indict black and economically-
disadvantaged defendants significantly more often or exclusively. For ex-
ample, because the amount of crime in a ghetto is higher than in a middle-
class suburb,8 ' the chances are greater that a ghetto resident will be flee-
ing from the scene of a crime." The chances are greater that a policeman
will be killed by a black defendant, not only because there are more
policemen patrolling black communities, but because of police attitudes
toward black offenders in general and the resulting induced disrespect
,,9 Id. at 360.
180 Id.
,81 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See
Rogers v. Herman Lodge, 458 U.S. ., 102 S.Ct. at 3272 (1982). Justice Stevens
is critical of the Court's emphasis on a showing of subjective intent or purpose
in equal protection analyses. Id. at __, 102 S.Ct. at 3283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182 G.M. SYKES, THE FUTURE OF CRIME 11-16 (1980).
1' "Murder, rape, burglary, larceny and robbery are all far more likely to be
committed by individuals from lower economic strata than by those higher on
the social scale." Id. at 28. Minorities, especially blacks, are often poor, and the
variables of poverty and race overlap. S.T. REID, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 300
(1976). See V.L. SWIGERT & R.A. FARRELL, MURDER, INEQUALITY, AND THE LAW
(1976).
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for the police in the black community."' Without a more complete track-
ing system for capital cases, a member of a suspect or unpopular minority
is at the mercy of the prosecutor and subject to any of his personal
prejudices.
The state of Ohio has a history of a racially-discriminatory application
of prosecutorial discretion resulting in the discriminatory infliction of the
death penalty. 85 The race of the offender appears to be a critical factor.
In 1977, 41.4% of all offenders categorized in murder cases were black."'
However, the commitment rate to death row in 1977 was 64% black. 87
When the victim's race is considered, a subtle form of discrimination
becomes apparent. Not one white offender was sentenced to death for
the aggravated murder of a black from January 1, 1974, to July 3, 1978.88
Only twelve black offenders with black victims were sentenced to death
while fifty black offenders with white victims were sentenced to death. 89
Significantly, the race of the offender in relation to the race of the victim
is a subtle yet critical factor in determining whether a death sentence
is imposed. 9
"u Blacks are also disadvantaged [in the system of criminal justice] because
of their perceptions of the police and the courts. In a 1969 study, 224
respondents from a black ghetto neighborhood, a white working-class
neighborhood, and a middle class white neighborhood, were interviewed
concerning their attitudes toward police. They were asked about the ideal
policeman and then asked what they think is actually characteristic of
policemen. On all measures, there was a statistically significant difference
between the responses of blacks and whites ....
S.T. REID, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 300-01 (1976).
185 THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 208-11 (H.A. BEDAU 3d ed. 1982); May-
nard, Ohio's Other Lottery System-The Death Penalty (1980) (available from the
Am. Civ. Lib. Union in Columbus, Ohio).
' Maynard, supra note 185, at 8.
187 Id.
' Id. at 9.
... Id. It appears as if the state of Ohio places a higher value on the life of
a white person than on the life of a black person. Id. at 10.
1 THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 206-24, 367-68 (H.A. BEDAU 3d ed. 1982).
See Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Ex-
perience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981); Zimring, Eigen & O'Malley, Punishing
Homicide in Philadelphia: Perspectives on the Death Penalty, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
227 (1976). See generally Note, Discrimination and Arbitrariness in Capital Punish-
ment: An Analysis of Post-Furman Murder Cases in Dade County, Florida,
1973-1976, 33 STAN. L. REV. 75, 88 (1980) (cases with white victims resulted in
death penalty convictions significantly more often than cases with black victims
when no distinction is made between felony and non-felony murders).
Factors with no statistical significance in the use of the death penalty in Ohio
were marital status, education, religion, sex of the victim and age of the victim.
Maynard, supra note 185, at 8-15. The sex of the offender, however, is signifi-
cant. Of the 343 prisoners executed in Ohio, three were female. Id. at 2. Of the
105 death-row prisoners studied, four were female. Id. at 10. All of the prisoners
currently on death row are men.
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The discretion of the prosecutor is highly relevant.'9' The facts of a
case or the weight of the state's evidence are not always considered by
the prosecutor when deciding whether to charge a capital offense.19 ' The
state's fiscal policy '93 and the prosecutor's possible racial prejudices should
not be discounted.'94 However, the focal point for the possible infliction
of punishment as severe as death should be the act and substance of the
crime itself. Fiscal policy and prejudice should play no part when deciding
among similarly-situated defendants in terms of the crime committed who
may or may not die.
V. CONCLUSION
Three proposals to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the specified
aggravating circumstances in Ohio's statute are as follows. First, the ag-
gravating circumstances may be eliminated so that the jury can deter-
mine all aggravating factors, just as it considers all mitigating factors.
This alternative is impermissible since it restores jury discretion in a
disguised fashion.
Second, the aggravating circumstances may be revised to specify only
the most heinous aggravated murders. This alternative would require the
inclusion of torture, all aggravated murders with prior calculation and
design, mass murders and murders for hire. The aggravating cir-
cumstances should be based on the seriousness of the offense, not the
identity of the victim. Otherwise, there is no reason for excluding from
protection particularly defenseless individuals such as children or the
elderly.'9 5
The third solution is to implement a comprehensive tracking system
for aggravated murder cases to ensure adequate appellate review for
discriminatory application. By recognizing the uniqueness of the penalty
itself, ' the Supreme Court has, in effect, given a form of heightened
scrutiny to claims arising under state death penalty statutes. Since the
penalty itself is not unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has declared
that the judiciary will review death penalty cases to assure that any par-
"' Maynard, supra note 185, at 25-31. See Zeisel, supra note 190, at 466-68.
19 Maynard, supra note 185, at 26. A prosecutor's concern for effective caseload
management to maximize public acceptance may affect a decision to charge a
capital offense. Zeisel, supra note 190, at 466.
1 Maynard, supra note 185, at 26.
194 Zeisel, supra note 190, at 467.
,95 The following state statutes provide protection for certain defenseless in-
dividuals: CAL. PENAL CODE S 190.2(a)(17)(v) (West Supp. 1982) (child); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, S 4209(e), (q), (r), (s) (1979) (pregnant victim; handicapped, disabled,
elderly; defenseless victim); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 9-1(b)(6)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982-83) (child); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (Burns 1979) (child); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, S 413(d)(5) (1982) (child).
'" Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-58 (1977).
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ticular death sentence was not imposed on the basis of whim, mistake,
passion or prejudice."7 Therefore, it is urged that careful and heightened
scrutiny by the court be given to discriminatory application allegations
of any state's death penalty statute, even when the burden of proving
a discriminatory purpose, if necessary, cannot quite be met at the time
of any one individual's trial or appeal. Because the Supreme Court recog-
nizes the severity of this particular punishment, the state should bear
the burden of eliminating any potential discriminatory application. When,
as in Ohio, there is unchecked prosecutorial discretion at the charging
stage without an adequate tracking system,'98 coupled with evidence of
past discriminatory application'99 involving substantially the same ag-
gravating circumstances,"°° the Supreme Court must take notice and act
with the rights of the individual in mind.
It is unfortunate if the judiciary closes its doors to scrutiny of death
penalty statutes when the life of any individual is at stake and where
there is any possibility that discriminatory application may occur. Because
discretion enables the death penalty to be applied selectively against the
poor, racial minorities, unpopular groups, or those lacking political clout,'
the judiciary has the duty to require that state statutes comply with con-
stitutional mandates to protect individual rights. It is an affront to our
system of justice that so many may have to die before a requisite burden
of proof is accumulated." 2 Justice Douglas recognized that there is no
permissible "caste" aspect of law enforcement in a nation committed to
equal protection of the laws." It is for this reason that the Supreme Court
must apply close scrutiny to Ohio's new death penalty statute before in-
dividuals die at the hands of the state under a statute which may later
be recognized as denying due process and equal protection.
ELAINE C. HILLIARD
'91 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191 See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
200 Compare supra note 9 (Ohio's 1974 aggravating circumstances), with OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. S 2929.04(A) (Page 1982) (Ohio's 1981 aggravating circumstances).
201 Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
202 Significantly, after admitting to past discrimination in earlier death penalty
cases, government officials will contend that the data is insufficient to support
allegations of continuing racial discrimination in current death penalty cases. Zeisel,
supra note 190, at 458.
203 Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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